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ABSTRACT Social democracy based on welfare and the redistribution of social contribu-
tions is failing. The accumulation of wealth and the increase in inequalities are the two faces
of Janus that social democracy has not been able to contain over the recent decades. In this
context, it matters to discuss John Rawls’s influential difference principle. According to the
maximin criterion put forth by Rawls, it does not suffice that no one becomes worse off; those
who are worse off must also become better off than they are. Here, we note that the
existence and growth of inequality find no opposition in the maximin rule. Despite appear-
ances, strictly speaking it merely introduces a factor of social compensation, a sort of
“assistencialism” to the victims of the greatest inequality. Even the most robust formulation
of the principle of difference, according to which the greatest advantage to the less advan-
taged is indispensable, does not per se preclude an aggregate growth of inequalities. It seems
clear that it was an egalitarian goal what Rawls had in mind in A Theory of Justice. Rawls’s
critical comments on welfare capitalism must indeed not be forgotten—especially in his
further explanations about the application of the principles of justice in a property-owning
democracy. Here, as in liberal socialism, the dispersion of property, capital and resources
prevents economic and political powers from being concentrated into the hands of a minority.
However, the egalitarian aim does not strictly follow from the difference principle as stated,
whether taken literally as an application of the maximin rule or inferring from its strongest
formulation. A reformulation that does justice to the egalitarian aim of the principle of
difference is, however, possible: namely, a degrowthist reformulation, truly requiring a
degrowth in accumulation and inequalities, making explicit a brake clause that hinders the
aggregate growth of inequalities. Such a degrowthist conception of the difference principle
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The difficulties facing social democracy today and the debate
on Rawls’s difference principle
There is no doubt today that social democracy based on thewelfare state and on the redistributive social transfers isfailing. On this topic, data found in Overview of Inequality
Trends, Key Findings and Policy Directions (2015) is particularly
enlightening. It indicates a significant increase in inequalities in
OECD countries based on a comparison of data from the mid-
1980s with data from 2013 or more recent years. It is important to
monitor the evolution of inequalities in OECD countries because
there has been, until the most recent years, a pattern of correcting
inequalities by way of redistribution policies. In fact, such policies
in these countries have been getting weaker, and the capacity for
correcting inequalities diminishing. Therefore, notable increases
in Gini coefficients have been recorded in countries subject to
severe tax consolidation policies (as a result of the debt crisis), but
also in countries such as Sweden and New Zealand (OECD, 2015,
p. 24).
Inequalities are increasing, as is the concentration of wealth,
despite traditional social transfers. This follows a trend dating
back to the end of the 1970s in English-speaking countries such as
the USA and the UK. The trend spread to other OECD member
countries in the 1980s, and has had a significant effect since the
turn of the millennium in OECD states with the lowest levels of
income inequality, such as the Scandinavian countries.
In fact, the accumulation of wealth and the escalation in
inequalities are two faces of Janus that social democracy has been
unable to contain. Perhaps simply under an illusion, we are dri-
ven to say that real social democracy has been failing for decades
in the face of an increasingly unequal world. Perhaps, taking
advantage of the ambivalence between egalitarianism and welfare
capitalism, social democracy has leaned towards the latter. The
idea of social democracy’s ambivalence should be taken seriously.
Indeed, it is symptomatic that John Rawls himself recognises, in
Justice as Fairness (2001), as a serious failing of A Theory of Justice
(1971), that it did not sufficiently underscore the contrast
between welfare capitalism and property-owning democracy.
Without going too far in our interpretation, we can say that the
risks of ambivalence in the understanding of Rawls’s A Theory of
Justice (TJ), identified by the author himself, are equivalent to the
risks of ambivalence in social democracy roughly since the 1970s.
In terms of emphasis, it is necessary to acknowledge dangers
such as those recently raised by Walter Scheidel in The Great
Leveler: Violence and the History of Inequality from the Stone Age
to the Twenty-First Century (2017). Its primary and controversial
thesis is that over time the greatest social levelers, which have
actually corrected accumulated inequalities, have always been one
of four: great epidemics, state collapses, wars that involve mass
mobilisation, and revolutionary movements that change social
order. Scheidel’s thesis should concern us. The conditions that
make it possible for inequalities to grow are largely the result of
accumulation processes at times of economic growth and peace.
They involve stable periods that run smoothly, protected by laws
that guarantee continuity and the rights that this continuity
produces. The violence of wars or revolutions, or even a massive
natural disaster, interrupts that continuity. The bitter irony is that
these “great levelers” that are increasingly within the reach of
human hands are, although destructive, desires; and the greater
the inequalities, the more such desires there will be. This was the
case in the early decades of the 20th century and it is crucial for
us to understand that the same thing will happen again if we
continue to widen the opportunity gap in contemporary societies.
What is important to retain here is not so much that violence has
historically been a great leveler but that significant unevenness
has been the source and stage for mass violence. There is no
alternative between evils, but rather two evils that mutually feed
each other in a cycle that, with enough historical retrospection,
reveals itself to be truly infernal. The alternative must therefore be
an alternative to past history. Piketty (2013) has also given his-
torical evidence that the periods of the 20th century when there
were reversals in the accumulation of inequalities in Europe were
during the two great wars.
Within this theoretical and historical framework that forms an
indisputable trend towards greater inequalities in places where
social democratic models have taken precedence, we propose
revisiting and returning to the discussion of the concept of social
justice, which has become more precious to social democracy and
progressivism in general. In particular, returning to a discussion
of John Rawls’s famous difference principle (DP) within the
framework of principles that form the concept of justice proposed
by the philosopher in the hope that overcoming its ambivalence
could be the key to overcoming the corresponding ambivalence of
social democracy itself.
According to the DP, inequalities are not fair from a utilitarian
viewpoint, which aims for the greatest good for the greatest
number. Rightly so, since this means it is unacceptable to sacrifice
minorities and individuals. Neither are inequalities acceptable
under a criterion that complies with Pareto optimality, in which
inequalities are acceptable until someone is harmed. This would
make anything licit, as long as the condition that no one is
harmed is completely satisfied; as though there were nothing
wrong with inequality in itself—inequality being, by very defini-
tion, relative to others. In the debate with rivals in the field of
rational choice theory, the maximin criterion put forth by Rawls
is more exacting: it does not suffice that no one becomes worse
off; also those who are worse off must become better off than they
are. Put simply, this criterion precludes objection to Pareto
optimality. With barely more than a few crumbs, the maximin
rule can be met. And while, with greater conviction, this strategy
can counter and indeed diminish the most extreme poverty, it is
no less true that it allows for a boundless growth of inequalities.
The existence and growth of inequality find no opposition in the
maximin rule, which, despite appearances, merely introduces a
factor of social compensation, a sort of “assistencialism” to the
victims of the greatest inequality.
What would it take, then? Starting with a negative: that those in
the worst conditions might see their circumstances somewhat
improved is not enough to justify allowing inequalities to
increase. The inequalities that are inevitable in any free, non-
totalitarian society become acceptable when, and only when,
inequalities are not allowed to increase. Most likely this was what
Rawls had in mind in TJ, though it does not necessarily follow
from the explicit outline of his principles of justice, namely his
difference principle, particularly if taken literally as an application
of the maximin rule.
A maximin strategy without assistencialism should not cir-
cumvent the demand to not increase the curve of inequality. But
how to ensure that it does not allow it? Considerations outside the
formulation of his own principles of justice are not enough,
however explicit they may be, such as when Rawls says: “The even
larger difference between classes violates the principle of mutual
advantage as well as democratic equality” (TJ, revised edition,
p. 68s).
Van Parijs has expressed similar dissatisfaction, as well as
noted a significant variation in how the DP is formulated, con-
cluding that the last of such formulations would be immune to
ambivalence. We shall briefly go over the three outlines that Van
Parijs presents, but keeping the doubts that we have presented,
and then we shall move on with a different strategy: no longer
finding a satisfactory Rawlsian version of the difference principle,
but another, still Rawlsian grounding for a more solid egalitarian
formulation of the difference principle.
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The first version of the DP in TJ establishes that “social and
economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a)
reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage” (TJ, revised
edition, p. 53). Following Rawls, Parijs identifies ambiguities in
this formulation, requiring a more unequivocal version according
to which the DP would be as follows:
Assuming the framework of institutions required by equal
liberty and fair equality of opportunity, the higher
expectations of those better situated are just if and only if
they work as part of a scheme which improves the
expectations of the least advantaged members of society.
The intuitive idea is that the social order is not to establish
and secure the more attractive prospects of those better off
unless doing so is to the advantage of those less fortunate.
(TJ, revised edition, p. 65)
So, Parijs concludes from this second formulation, apparently
free from ambiguities highlighted by Rawls himself, exactly the
same thing we generally suggested above regarding his DP. In
other words, it allows for very non-egalitarian interpretations to
be made of it: “all that is needed to justify an inequality, however
large, is some improvement, however tiny, for the worse off,
relative to the conceivably very depressed counterfactual situation
of total equality between the expectations of the more fortunate
and the less fortunate.” (Parijs, 2003, p. 204)
Simply, Parijs finds in the third formulation of the DP, which
Rawls presents as the simplest, an egalitarian commitment of a
higher order, free of ambiguities. The formulation is:
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that
they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least
advantaged and (b) attached to offices and positions open
to all under conditions of equality of opportunity. (TJ, 83/
72 revised edition)
Parijs consider this a “far more demanding formulation”
(Parijs, 2003, p. 204) and, within it, highlights the expression “to
the greatest benefit”. Only clause (a) relates to the DP and
nothing more is said other than that inequalities have to be of the
greatest benefit of the least advantaged. Is this enough? Rather
than some benefit to the least advantaged, however small the
crumbs, Rawls does in fact raise the stakes to the greatest benefit
of those least advantaged people. But the greatest benefit relative
to what came prior or the greatest benefit compared to all other
beneficiaries of that inequality? If it is the former, the meaning of
this formulation would end up being exactly the same as the
previous one. If it is the latter, we would in fact be rejecting that
there is any greater benefit for the most advantaged than the
benefit achieved by the least advantaged. But can we be certain
that this leads to less inequality? If the greatest benefit for the least
advantaged is an aggregate benefit, it is not hard to imagine
situations in which inequality would still grow extensively, par-
ticularly if inequality is already quite serious. Let us suppose, for
example, that there are a million least advantaged people and only
10 most advantaged people. A million crumbs may satisfy the
criterion of the greatest benefit for the least advantaged if the
benefit for the most advantaged is “only” half a million crumbs. If
these are distributed among only the 10 most advantaged, then
inequality will increase drastically. Furthermore, if the inter-
pretation is the strictest possible—according to which none of the
most advantaged may obtain a greater benefit than any of the
least advantaged—we can easily conclude that this is an excessive
version that will certainly conflict with hierarchically superior
principles of justice, starting with those pertaining to liberties. But
neither of these is the interpretation we should make within the
Rawlsian system of the “greatest benefit” for the least advantaged.
As Rawls makes very clear in the outlines he makes before the
third formulation of the DP, “the greatest benefit” does not refer
to a comparison with either the previous situation or an absolute
comparison with the benefit of the most advantaged, but to a
comparison with the benefits that the least advantaged could have
under the circumstances. This consideration, although indis-
putable, is not explicitly contained in any formulation of the DP,
which means ambivalent interpretations may remain.
Although the democratic equality contained in the principles of
justice has been the target of political criticisms as much from the
right as from the left, we believe that Norman Daniels’ reasoning
remains extremely justified:
A society conforming to its three principles would probably
assure people more equality than is provided in any society
we see around us today—even the most egalitarian social
welfare states. (Daniels, 2003, p. 243)
The challenge we are embracing is, then, within a Rawlsian
grounding, and informed by his political thought in Justice as
Fairness (JF), to propose another formulation of the DP immune
to ambivalent interpretations that make growth in inequalities
acceptable, even if against the more accurate interpretation of
Rawls position in TJ.
Deepening attention to the principle of fair equality of
opportunity and the difference principle
Next, will deepen attention to the relationship between the second
principle of justice (and the two components thereof—the prin-
ciple of fair equality of opportunity (FEO) and the difference
principle) and the problem of promoting egalitarianism.
The second principle of justice regulates social and economic
inequalities and makes them subordinate to the first, and they
cannot restrict it. This means that basic liberties cannot become
contingencies dependent on any considerations related to
society’s economic order. Furthermore, Rawls adds that the
unconditional nature of basic liberties is found in a society that is
not in a situation of either extreme abundance or extreme
scarcity, therefore guaranteeing enough means for the normal
functioning of the basic structure regulated by a political notion
of justice.
The definitive formulation of the second principle is as follows:
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that
they are both:
(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent
with the just savings principle, and
(b) attached to offices and positions open to all under
conditions of fair equality of opportunity. (TJ, revised
edition, p. 266)
The two subprinciples—DP and FEO—establish regulatory
conditions for social and economic inequalities and therefore
implement distributive justice as a central feature of justice as
fairness. In fact, the way Rawls justifies the existence of dis-
tributive policies goes back to the need to determine, in the basic
structure of a well-ordered society, procedures that ensure the
preservation of a fair social cooperation system from generation
to generation. In other words, distributive justice can be justified
by a procedural background justice that ensures conditions are
preserved to sustain society itself in the very terms in which it has
been regulated by a certain notion of justice. As explained in “The
Basic Structure as Subject” (1977), a fair basic structure guaran-
tees “background justice” (Rawls, 1977, p. 160) based on which
the justice or fairness of agreements among individuals and
associations can be assessed from a social standpoint.
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On the one hand, (b) is a principle of equality of opportunities
that cannot be reduced equal treatment of all before the
law–isonomy. It is more than that: an equality of opportunities
that reaches down to the crucial material conditions needed to
provide real, and not merely virtual, equality of opportunities.
Rawls argues that those who have the same innate qualities and
share the same level of motivation should have the same oppor-
tunities for success, regardless of their natural or social condition.
This principle is different from the meritocratic principle,
according to which the most talented people, or those that are
more socially advantaged, have greater and better opportunities.
On the other hand, as already discussed, (a) is called DP and
has a criterion for use in the maximin, although it is not neces-
sarily a single criterion or even a necessary one. As a heuristic
instrument, it is useful to consider the two principles of justice as
the maximin solution to the issue of social justice. In the same way
that, in accordance with the maximin rule, subjects choose the
option in which the worst result is better than the worst results of
the others, the choice of principles of justice such as fairness is
made under the assumption that individuals are in the lowest
social position, since their real social situation is unknown. This
relationship comes from the fact that the two principles are those
that any subject would choose for a notion of a society in which he
or she was assigned his or her position by a “malevolent oppo-
nent” (TJ, revised edition, p. 132s). Despite this analogy, the two
principles that govern basic institutions should not be confused
with the rule underlying the choice to follow them. Rawls, then,
avoids using the name maximin criterion of fairness for the DP
and highlights a distinction between the two—while the maximin
rule concerns rules for making choices in uncertain situations, the
DP is a special criterion applicable, in the first place, to the basic
structure of society through representative subjects whose expec-
tations should be assessed using a list of primary social goods
(Idem, p. 72s). Notwithstanding the practical validity of the
maximin rule, its application as a moral principle for assigning
social benefits is unacceptable (see Harsanyi, 1975), since it would
lead society towards widespread impoverishment.
It is therefore important to shed light on the merely analogical
relationship between the maximin rule and the DP—both favour
the worst situations—and untangle the reasoning that governs
calculations for a principle for allocation purposes. Solving
practical problems using the maximin rule leads to absurd results.
For example, if medicines are scarce and the government decides
to give them to terminally ill patients, it would end up making the
situation worse for patients who would actually benefit from
taking them. This decision collides with the inherent requirement
of the DP which states that the situation of the least advantaged
should be improved without making the social situation of all the
others worse. In this specific case, it is not acceptable to refuse a
cure to all those who have a chance at being cured.
Rawls acknowledges the irrational consequences of applying the
maximin rule to real-world needs; especially because “(…) it
seems extraordinary that the justice of increasing the expectations
of the better placed by a billion dollars, say, should turn on
whether the prospects of the least favoured increase or decrease by
a penny” (TJ, revised edition, p. 136). This difficulty is also similar
to applying the DP to the hypothesis illustrated by the following
objection: since it aims to maximise long-term expectations of the
least advantaged, the fairness of large increases or reductions in
the expectations of the most advantaged may depend on small
changes to the expectations of the others. This hypothesis is
abstract and forgets that i) the notion of justice as fairness,
inherent to both principles, applies to the basic structure of society
as a whole; and ii) the occurrence of such contingencies is avoided
at the outset by applying the principle of equal liberties and the
FEO. Similarly, and more clearly, in “Some Reasons for the
Maximin Criterion” (1974), Rawls clarifies that the maximin rule
does not influence the direct allocation of goods. Although suitable
for the choice of principles for the basic structure of society—
macro contexts—it is not suitable for micro contexts. It cannot be
adapted, for example, “to how a doctor should treat his patients or
a university its students” (Rawls, 1974a, p. 226). The principles of
social justice are macro principles, therefore they cannot be tested
or contradicted by “micro” applications (Rawls, 1974b, p. 235).
Against those who believe a very large aversion to risk to be the
main reason for choosing the DP, Rawls demonstrates that
adoption of the maximin strategy arises not from this but from a
desire for stability in the social justice system introduced. This is
also true because aversion to risk by parties in the original
position is no less than the aversion felt by any normal person
(Rawls, 1974a, p. 228) and aversion to risk alone is a no more
decisive reason than the others underlying the choice of the DP
over other alternatives: the fact that its application requires
“much less information”, its greater capacity as a “public prin-
ciple,” and “the strains of commitment” (Idem, p. 229).
The Rawlsian maximin strategy is not, therefore, so much a
foundation of the DP as an argumentative strategy of justice as
fairness against utilitarianism. But this is the first stage of the
argument, in which principles of justice are chosen for how much
they protect basic liberties and the FEO of risks arising from
utilitarian social calculation, avoiding sacrifices of well-being for
some people to maximise overall or average utility (Shenoy and
Martin, 1982/3, p. 132s). This is followed by a second stage, in
which there is a search to find out if the distribution of income,
wealth and social and economic opportunities should be gov-
erned by the DP or by a principle that maximises average utility
(Rawls, 1974a, p. 238–242; p. 245–249). In other words, there is a
survey on how economic and social advantages should be dis-
tributed in order to respect relations among free, equal citizens.
Once the priority principles have been accepted, Rawlsian strat-
egy emphasises the notion of “collective asset” in the tenet of
mutual advantage implicit in the DP; according to this, no-one
should make gains at the cost of depriving others.
With the aim of providing essential conditions for a more
dignified life to the least advantaged, the second principle of
justice aims to restore the principle of equal liberty—which
eliminates the influence of social eventualities but approves a
distribution of wealth and income according to the natural lottery
(TJ, revised edition, p. 63s). Consider, for example, the FEO. It
demands that job candidates are considered for their relevant
talents and abilities while, at the same time, institutional measures
are introduced to avoid incidental factors (class, race, gender, etc.)
interfering in the normal development of potential. In turn, the
DPl restricts inequalities to those that work to the greatest
advantage of the group in the worst situation (Daniels, 2003: p.
241). With an egalitarian objective in sight, the latter principle
establishes that inequalities due to birth and natural ability,
because they are undeserved, require reparation—the “redress
principle”. So, “in order to treat all persons equally, to provide
genuine equality of opportunity, society must give more attention
to those with fewer native assets and those born into less
favourable social positions” (TJ, revised edition, p. 86).
The DP is a principle of mutual benefit, in other words, it
involves a situation of reciprocity. If we consider the existence of
only two social groups—the most advantaged and the least
advantaged—a society subordinated to the limits defined by the
lexical priority of the equal liberties principle and the FEO can
maximise the expectations of only one of the two groups. If the
DP is accepted, the system will maximise the expectations of the
less advantaged group. If it is not, it is preferable to maximise a
weighted average of both groups. Nonetheless, this maximisation
is doubly beneficial for the most fortunate: it compensates them
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for something that does not justify any prior right to benefits,
natural and social features that are neither fair nor unfair; and for
the importance it assigns to their expectations. The most
advantaged therefore recognise that the well-being of each person
depends on a scheme of social cooperation. And that the
voluntary cooperation of all in a social system requires reasonable
rules and particular care in improving the situation of the least
advantaged. As a result, “they forego the idea of maximising a
weighted mean and regard the difference principle as a fair basis
for regulating the basic structure” (TJ, revised edition, p. 88).
A situation in which there are more than two social groups is
more complex. Rawls treats this as a “chain connection”: if the
expectations of the least advantaged improve as a result of an
increase in the expectations of the most advantaged, the same
would happen for those in a medium position (TJ, revised edition,
pp. 70–73). He shows how common it is when other principles of
justice such as fairness are properly applied. In other words, in a
perfectly fair organisation, contributions by those who are in the
best situation spread throughout the social fabric. In such circum-
stances, the practical consequences of the DP approach those of the
principles of efficiency and average utility, when measured by pri-
mary goods. Nevertheless, these principles do not lead to a con-
tinuation of expectations among subjects representing the n groups
of a society, for which the DP presents a solution. It tells us that
in a basic structure with n relevant representatives, first
maximise the welfare of the worst off representative man;
second, for the equal welfare of the worst-off representative,
maximise the welfare of the second worst-off representative
man, and so on until the last case which is, for the equal
welfare of all the preceding n−1 representatives, maximise
the welfare of the best-off representative man. (Idem, p. 72)
As well as these benefits, the DP also encourages an inter-
pretation of the principle of fraternity (Rawls, 1968, p. 166s; TJ,
revised edition, 90s). A fraternal society is a social union of social
unions and does not foresee equality of conditions as a pre-
requisite (and this is, furthermore, not acceptable under the DP).
By joining an association whose members share the same notion
of justice, each individual guarantees the means crucial to pur-
suing their life plans—the principles of justice and fairness provide
more favourable conditions to pursuing individual notions of
good. Demonstration of stability reveals that individuals have a
moral motivation in the first place, a sense of justice, that they are
able to act accordingly and that this is not obstructed by any
barrier from the theory of human nature. Egalitarian liberalism
therefore seeks to show that, on the one hand, the sense of justice
is realistic in psychological terms and dominates over the impulses
of certain psychological tendencies (such as envy). On the other
hand, it shows that fairness and goodness are compatible.
The question remains: are the inequalities permitted by the
difference principle enough to incentivise social progress? If we
believe, as Rawls did, that they are an incentive to the middle
class’ commitment to productive forms of work and to invest-
ment by capitalists in equipment and improving productivity,
then we can believe that they are. This progress translates into
gains in production, beneficial for the least advantaged group in
the form of a supplement to income or wealth. The difference
principle stipulates maximising the combination of this material
gain with the social bases of self-respect, which in Rawlsian terms
is the most important primary social good.
In a certain way, what happens with the growth of the differ-
ence principle in a rule of three that is the maximin criterion is
the same as what happens with Adam Smith’s argument in the
analogy of the invisible hand. Although it is John Rawls himself,
in Political Liberalism, who realises this and takes responsibility
for the excessive emphasis on rational choice theory in TJ:
Here I correct a remark in Theory, p. 16, where it is said
that the theory of justice is a part of the theory of rational
decision. From what we have just said, this is simply
incorrect. What should have been said is that the account of
the parties, and of their reasoning, uses the theory of
rational decision, though only in an intuitive way. The
theory is itself part of a political conception of justice, one
that tries to give an account of reasonable principles of
justice. There is no thought of deriving those principles
from the concept of rationality as the sole normative
concept. I believe that the text of Theory as a whole
supports this interpretation. (Rawls 1993, II n. 7, p. 53)
For an advanced social democracy: property-owning
democracy
It is interesting to see that in the possible variations of the principles
of justice—equal liberties, FEO and DP—most of the options at
stake are notions of social justice that cover the contemporary
ideological spectrum. We shall seek to explore how these differences
can be identified through variation exercises. We will then enter
into a discussion about the reasons that lead Rawls to argue for a
notion of property-owning democracy (POD) and that place it on a
much more egalitarian footing than welfare capitalism.
Heuristically, it is interesting to note the possibility of differ-
entiating between the great ideological choices of the more con-
temporary party political framework by observing only its
variations in behaviour when dealing with the three components
of the Rawlsian principles of justice.
Libertarianism will commit to the principle of liberties and a
merely formal principle of equal opportunities that essentially
corresponds to isonomy, that is, equality before the law. Its
defence is limited to the minimal state, in charge of security and
organising the three sovereign powers: legislative, executive and
judiciary. But without a social state to guarantee actual equality of
opportunities, and even less so redistributive policies. Under
libertarianism, support for the poorest springs from the will of
philanthropists. This is largely the regime that Rawls calls laissez-
faire capitalism.
Liberalism is committed to the principle of liberties and the
FEO but not to the DP. Nonetheless, these commitments are
enough for, further to the minimum functions of the state, there
to be a social state that promotes the empowerment of citizens to
access opportunities, one that guarantees, for example, a universal
right to education. The fundamental reason why genuine liber-
alism involves accepting the demand for actual equality of
opportunities relates to the central role played by the idea of
universality of opportunities in it. It would clearly be illiberal for a
society that professed to have freedom of opportunities—classic
laissez-faire—while at the same time accepting opportunities to be
removed by society.
Rawls’s egalitarian liberalism is committed to the three com-
ponents of the principles of justice and it is hard to find a closer
ideological choice in the European political party tradition than
classical social democracy. In fact, the state’s intervention in this
is restricted to guaranteeing the FEO as far as possible. It also
implements redistributive policies that can be justified in several
ways, including the fact that the FEO itself cannot be guaranteed
without a policy, at a particular time, to allow and restrain
inequalities. In the light of this, we shall analyse how close it is to
property-owning democracy (POD) and liberal socialism (LS), as
defined by Rawls, in contrast with welfare state capitalism (WSC).
Provided that it is democratic in the sense that it has repre-
sentative democracy, with a separation of sovereign powers and
the rule of law, it undertakes these principles of justice and adds
to them another function of the state. As well as guaranteeing fair
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equality of opportunity and redistributive policies, it considers
that the state should have the power to intervene in the economy,
limiting the market economy in several ways. For example, by
removing its sphere of influence in particularly sensitive fields,
such as areas inherent to the welfare state, public health and
education, or strategic production sectors on which the country is
especially dependent.
Rawls appeals to rational judgement, but he does so within a
framework that favours liberal economic rationality based on indi-
vidual choices that maximise one’s own interests. Particularly in the
political liberalism stage, where the parties of the contract are
representatives of democratic citizens, people who are free and equal
with an extensive interest in exercising their capacities of rationality
(to develop a notion of good) and fairness (sense of justice).
Rawls, despite concluding on the advantages of a certain ega-
litarianism with a liberal slant, does so under terms that are
debatable in the eyes of anyone who does not identify with that
framework. As if egalitarianism were accidental in a liberal-
defensive line of thought (Mouffe, 1993). However, it is important
to clarify something at this point. In the contemporary debate on
social justice, the meaning of the term “equality” cannot be
reduced to a description of people as equal beings or egalitarian
conditions; it is used, on the other hand, to justify a more equal
distribution of goods, services and opportunities among people. It
is in accordance with this second meaning that the Rawlsian
principles of distributive justice take on egalitarian characteristics
(see Gutmann, 1980, p. 2). By connecting the idea of justice to an
egalitarian allocation of social goods, Rawls introduces an
important restriction: individuals are treated as equals by elim-
inating not all inequalities, but only those that favour certain
people. An inequality that is beneficial for any individual, in that
it deals with socially useful skills and energies, will be accepted by
all. The idea that inequalities that broaden our initial fair share
are acceptable and inequalities that hinder it are not is the core of
the theory of justice as fairness. Rawlsian egalitarianism therefore
demonstrates the social relativity of natural differences between
individuals (see Cabrita, 2007, p. 252).
Can applying the Rawlsian principles of justice overcome the
failings of the social democratic welfare state—the accumulation
of wealth and worsening inequalities? At first glance, we could say
that Rawls’s egalitarian liberalism, with its defence of justice as
fairness (with an emphasis on reciprocity) opens a path to
building a more egalitarian society. Although institutionally
harmful to welfare state capitalism (WSC), which encourages
social polarisation between the rich and poor and assigns a
determining role to “intermediaries” in the redistribution of social
assets (dualist model of the welfare state), Rawlsian liberalism,
especially through the debate it triggered regarding the DP, seems
to shed light on the possibility of regenerating the full model of
the welfare state. This model, which has been most extensively
perfected in the social democratic systems of the Scandinavian
countries and corroded by the imperatives of globalisation since
the last decades of the 20th century, took on a much more
demanding social programme than the dualist model.
Presumably, and given the familial association between social
democracy and social liberalism in European political language,
the attempt to restructure this welfare state model in light of the
POD may seem paradoxical. In this sense, it is worth reminding
that this regime was idealised by economist James Meade in the
1960s, with the aim of reconciling the diffusion and equalisation
of ownership of private property with the growth of state property
in the British economy as a whole. In these terms, the POD
represents not so much an alternative to LS (as it does to WSC) as
a supplement to it. Rawls closely follows Meade’s understanding
of the POD (see Rawls, 2001, p. 135, note 1), and subsequently
invites a reading that the delay in the analysis of this regime
cloaks a leaning towards a LS (see Edmundson, 2017, p. 76s), “a
regime was envisaged by the English Labour Party and the Ger-
man Social Democrats (Rawls, 2008, p. 150, note 12).
On the other hand, in the strictly economic sense and in light
of the republican liberal theory of justice (Thomas, 2017),
Meade’s model of the POD may also be interpreted as a form for
individuals to safeguard their liberties in face of the dangers of
oligarchical drift and domination.
Without lingering on the recent debate on which of the two
ideal regimes—the POD or SL—is the most apt for implementing
the principles of justice as fairness (Edmundson, 2017; Thomas,
2017), we will focus our analysis on Rawls, who, while not stating
preference for one regime over another, puts emphasis on
the POD.
In TJ, Rawls identifies the most suitable ideal regimes for
applying the principles of justice as fairness—POD and LS
regimes—and he made a vague distinction between POD and
WSC—a small gesture that stimulated the erroneous reading of
his theory as a “defence” of WSC. As a result of this mis-
understanding, at the end of the 1980s, the philosopher went into
more detail about the characteristics of POD that set it apart from
WSC (see Rawls, 2001, p. 135–179). The conclusion of his
reflections on this theme in JF support the proposal made in TJ
on the most suitable democratic regimes for applying his prin-
ciples of justice. Rawls writes:
Both a property-owning democracy and a liberal socialist
regime set up a constitutional framework for democratic
politics, guarantee the basic liberties with the fair value of
the political liberties and fair equality of opportunity, and
regulate economic and social inequalities by a principle of
mutuality, if not by the difference principle. (2001, p. 138)
Due to the dispersion of ownership of capital and resources,
both regimes stop economic and political powers from being
concentrated into the hands of a minority. The political side of LS
is characteristically pluralist, and its economic side is co-inhabited
by a range of independent companies operating in a free market.
But, because the means of production and natural resources in
this regime are public property, its distributive function is highly
limited; on the other hand, the private property system uses prices
in different ways to achieve both objectives. The choice of one of
these two regimes is due to a society’s historical circumstances, its
tradition of political thought and practice.
However, Rawls did not focus so much on the differences
between POD and LS (the issue of property in the means of
production) as on the differences between POD and CWS. Unlike
LS, both the latter regimes allow the means of production to be
privately owned, which is more favourable for implementing the
DP (see Freeman, 2007, p. 226). Rawls’s focus on POD and the
influence of Krouse and McPherson’s (1988) interpretation can
be seen. According to this analysis, what as at the heart of the
disparities between the two regimes is the difference in strategy in
the provision of justice in the political economy: while WSC
accepts a substantial inequality in the initial distribution of
property and natural talents as a given and, therefore, seeks to
redistribute income ex post, POD searches for greater equality in
the distribution of property and natural talent ex ante, with less
emphasis on subsequent redistribution measures.
It is indeed against the backlight of WSC, especially the focus
on its shortcomings, that Rawls describes POD. Following the list
presented by Freeman (2007, p. 226–231), we highlight the most
relevant for our goal:
1. While WSC allows monopolies of the means of production
by a small class, POD promotes wider ownership of the
means of production so that workers can control the real
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capital and their working conditions as private owners,
members of trade unions or worker cooperatives (see Rawls,
2001, p. 139). Lying between trade unionism and WSC, POD
includes several business management models—from the
traditional one, controlled by owners, to the model common
in some social democratic European countries (such as
Germany), co-led by management and workers, and models
controlled by workers, such as self-managed cooperatives
(Freeman, 2007, p. 220);
2. In POD there are no colossal disparities in income and
wealth between the most and least advantaged, as there are in
WSC. So, adding to the effects of the DP, protection of the
fair value of political liberty and the FEO require a reduction
in gross inequalities. In POD, great disparity in wealth is
discouraged by taxes on assets, inheritance and gifts. A
“progressive inheritance tax” aims to avoid extensive
concentrations of wealth passing from generation to genera-
tion (see Rawls, 2001, p. 161);
3. By assuming the fair value of political liberty, POD, unlike
WSC, supplies public funding for electoral campaigns,
restricting private funding, and provides public forums for
debate among alternative political agendas;
4. POD provides a greater FEO than WSC. For example,
workers not only have the chance to control the capital used
in the performance of their duties but have greater control
and protection in their workplaces. In other words, POD
inhibits relations of domination and degradation in the
division of labour. While it does not remove the division of
labour in a general sense, POD eliminates its worst aspects:
“no one be servilely dependent on others and made to choose
between monotonous and routine occupations which are
deadening to human thought and sensibility” (TJ, revised
edition, p. 464);
5. The social minimum is higher in POD than in WSC, since
it is established at the point where, taking salaries into
account, it maximises the expectations of the least
advantaged group (Idem, p. 252). In other words, its aim
is not to maximise the total amount of domestic wealth (as
in WSC) or the average level of income and wealth. And
this is guaranteed by family and special allowances in the
event of illness or unemployment and by mechanisms such
as gradual supplements to income—negative income tax
(Idem, p. 243);
6. Rather than income tax, which discourages from work
(people’s contributions to the production of goods and
services), POD applies a proportional expenditure tax. This is
a tax that applies only when a certain level of consumption is
reached, as Rawls highlights, “by taxing only total expendi-
tures above a certain income, the tax can be adjusted to allow
for an appropriate social minimum” (ibidem);
7. In POD, all physically able people are encouraged to work.
The state’s stabilisation sector has the task of reasonably
maintaining full employment—when the economic system
fails to provide full employment, the state takes on the role of
“employer of last resort” (civil service, national services, etc.).
WSC provides a social minimum to all citizens, even when
they can work but prefer not to, and makes citizens
dependent on its social system. In contrast, POD citizens,
who are committed to fair and equal cooperation, should
contribute with their part and not take advantage of the
efforts of others— this is an application of the principle of
fairness (see TJ, revised edition, p. 95) and reflects its
underlying moral commitment. In POD, the social minimum
“is rather a payment that democratic citizens are due, as a
matter of right, for their taking part in an complying with
just terms of social cooperation” (Freeman, 2007, p. 230);
8. While under WSC, the least advantaged employment is
remunerated with a minimum fixed salary paid by the
employer and aims to discourage the creation of new jobs,
under POD, those who have a low income in the labour
market are supported by public income supplements. This
measure is in accordance with the difference principle, since
its aim is to bring the least advantaged up to the reasonable
social minimum it requires;
9. Finally, in order to meet the requirements necessary for FEO
among free and equal citizens, POD provides universal health
care and universal education by applying public funds. The
expectations that ensure provision of health care at a certain
level are included as part of the social minimum. The state is
responsible for providing equal opportunities of education
and culture to people with similar abilities and motivations,
through funding for private schools and by setting up a
public education system.
Rather than the simple redistribution of income in favour of
those who, due to misfortune or accident, find themselves with a
less than decent standard of living, POD’s social justice goes
beyond CWS’s, leaving citizens with suitable means to properly
deal with their matters and take part in social cooperation. In
these cases, the state not only democratises wealth but empowers
the group targeted by social policies—the vision of a citizen-
owner in the POD’s social programme works against the negative
effects on self-respect and mutual respect in the individual-
customer vision of CWS’s social assistance.
For an advanced social democracy: degrowthist formulation
of the principle of justice and framework rules
In our understanding and, we are persuaded, in John Rawls’s, as
we have sought to demonstrate, it is not the application of a
maximin criterion that should be at stake in this discussion, but
rather the intentions of the DP and what it should serve.
Inequality does not have to pay a tax to equality, it has to be a
contribution to equality of opportunities. If it is not, we eventually
accept paying tax as being egalitarian, but we are wrong, because
that payment in truth buys an unlimited right to inequality. A DP
should stipulate that a new inequality can be accepted not because
it leaves the least advantaged better off than they were, but simply
because that new inequality leads to greater equality of oppor-
tunities for the social system.
It is important to make some clarifications about using this
notion of inequality. Inequality is not good or bad in itself, and
the same is true for equality. A glaring inequality or an equality
without liberty are both ways of reducing the horizon of oppor-
tunities for many in favour of others. For that reason, we should
aim for, as a valuable part of the rules, the widest horizon of
opportunities possible, fairly distributed among all. In a Rawlsian
context, we can call this FEO.
Faced with this framework, we propose formulating a more
robust version of the DP that hinders new inequalities via an
explicit regulation clause prohibiting an aggregate rise in
inequality. Thus, something in the style of the clause proposed by
Cohen (1988/1989), according to which a factor should be taken
into consideration that reflects the degree to which income is
concentrated, using the Gini coefficient. Furthermore, talking
about a liberal-egalitarian notion of justice would be at best
unclear and at worst a falsehood.
Unlike a strict principle of equality, an egalitarian principle
concludes that normative equality of liberties and opportunities,
which is contained in the first and second principles of justice,
requires substantial material equality. The DP, although lexically
subordinate to the remaining principles, is a condition that, if not
met, leaves the others oppressed and under siege. What general
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formulation can we propose, then, for a DP free from ambiv-
alences, indisputably beyond the commitments of welfare capit-
alism and social liberalism, to match the commitments of POD or
LS? A formulation that, in short, is explicitly compatible with a
non-assistencialist perspective, that does not focus on the most
vulnerable but also pursues a universal perspective, as in fact
happens with the other principles of justice proposed by Rawls.
On the positive side, a fairer formulation of the DP should be
degrowthist, actually demanding that the accumulation of
inequalities degrow. The formulation could be as follows:
New, discrete inequalities are only permissible if, as well as
meeting the maximin criterion, they degrow social inequal-
ities overall.
But how could such an abstract DP be implemented? The
egalitarian DP merely provides a criterion to fairly regulate the
practice of inequality. This was the case with Rawls’s DP and it is
the case for this reformulation. The difference lies in the fact that
this formulation intends to preserve and encourage equality. But
it does not differ from the first in the need for implementations,
which we could call rules.
For these rules, we propose the following:
1. Rule on the prevention of intergenerational inequality:
reduction in accumulation through inheritance taxes, tax
on large fortunes.
2. Rule on egalitarian impact assessment studies.
3. Rule on regulating the range of salaries.
Reduction in intergenerational inequality. The accumulation of
inequalities is not only the result of a notion of social justice that,
interpreted ambivalently, may not be as egalitarian as it appeared.
It is also the result of conditions, which apparently come before
political considerations, that organise the social experience into a
continuum over time in which nothing is lost. This is the only
way accumulation can be enabled that, without explicit action,
will not stop growing. Building that artificial “spontaneity”
induces, as if it were natural, the production and preservation of
inequalities and leads to the belief that reducing it is not, on the
other hand, natural. This is a political construction and is, of
course, politically debatable.
It is therefore necessary to rebuild a legal translation of our
relations with time to introduce more ways of reducing
accumulation, one that values it as a reduction in inequality:
the two faces of Janus, one of which, symbolically, in the original
myth, looked to the past and the other to the future. It involves
replacing one artificial construction with another, but the second
is more ecological, through legislation, public policies, collective
human will and action. And there are several lines of action that
can reintroduce entropy and balance in the socio-economic
process of time.
The idea of intergenerational justice takes root in the demand
for previous generations to leave following generations with the
same conditions they enjoyed, not depleting resources or causing
a lack of environmental sustainability. But in a society that
accumulates and concentrates wealth and increases inequalities,
reproducing them and amplifying them from generation to
generation, it is imperative to broaden the concept of inter-
generational justice to include regulation of inequalities. Broader
intergenerational justice should commit preceding generations to
not transmitting more inequalities to future generations than the
ones they encountered. Not leaving our children more inequal-
ities than we received involves a new notion of legacy, but one
that is shared socially. Established in that way, intergenerational
equality of opportunities must limit the right to transmit acquired
and accumulated privileges, even if they were acquired and
accumulated fairly, deservedly and as the result of hard work. In
order to do this, inheritance taxes must be established, along with
other policies that ensure the generations that come after us are
not condemned to face greater inequalities than we were. The
price to pay for a society of inheritors is a society of debtors and
the memory of debts. The Biblical pardon every seven years
already understood the need to dilute the memory of egoism into
social act of forgetting.
Rather differently, Rawls justifies the need for the practice of
intergenerational justice as a condition needed to guarantee the
bases of society itself. If society is seen as a fair association of
cooperation that spans generations, then each generation must
ensure that it leaves behind the fair basic structure of society for
those that come after it. That guarantee is made by respecting the
just savings principle, which works diachronically across genera-
tions as the DP does synchronically for each generation.
Naturally, the two coincide in each present time, making it a
clause included in the formulation of the DP.
Egalitarian impact assessment. A second framework rule that
structures the permissibility of inequality should restrict gov-
ernment activity, introducing, based on the contract that brings
citizens together in a political community, an obligation to
accompany the country’s economic governance with an egali-
tarian impact assessment.
This obligation should be grounded in the constitution and its
concrete result would be prior scrutiny of draft state budgets, as
well as any possible amending budgets, by a competent (and
independent) authority, with all measures that affect the state’s
income and expenditure being submitted to an egalitarian impact
assessment. This scrutiny may be included in the functions of the
Court of Auditors. In Portugal, for example, “the Court of
Auditors is the senior organ for the scrutiny of the legality of
public expenditure and for judging the accounts which the law
requires to be submitted to it” (Art. 214 of the Portuguese
Constitution). For this, proposed budgets should be submitted to
the Parliament together with a study regarding their impact on
equality, overseen beforehand by the Court of Auditors, and with
an explicit reference to the forecast evolution in social inequality
indicators.
Range of salaries. The third structuring rule should establish a
maximum range of salaries by setting salary limits when public
money is involved, limiting the right to a maximum income
through a reasonable comparison, in terms of dignity and social
justice, with the minimum income. This should apply to public
services and private services that involve some type of public
support, whether in the form of direct funding or exemptions and
other tax benefits. And if there is no public involvement in
remuneration, there should still be a demand for robust pro-
gressive taxation that is truly able to counteract the marked trend
towards increases in wage ratios; for example, the more than
1000% increase in the CEO-to-worker pay ratio since the 1950s
reported by Bloomberg in 2013. A degrowth perspective, or at
least a non-growth perspective, of inequalities should also involve
the degrowth or non-growth of wage ratios, of which the CEO-to-
worker pay ratio is a clear indicator.
The commitment to a degrowthist difference principle
formulated generally but that can be implemented in rules is
possible at the different scales involved in a society’s life, whether
in terms of intergenerational justice or in democratically chosen
public finances and a fair distribution of wages. With this general
formulation and a set of concrete implementation rules, we can
find social democracy’s commitment to egalitarianism,
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extensively justified by a Rawlsian base, is better grounded and
free from ambivalences. And it allows us to bring the principle of
difference into the emerging degrowth paradigm, which urgently
seeks to configure inequality as one dimension among several
whose growth is problematic in a context of global interdepen-
dence and scarcity of resources.
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